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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JOHN RICHARD KOCHER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981555-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (e) (1996).

A copy of the judgment is contained in

Addendum A.
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
The text of the following statutes and rules are found in
Addendum B:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Rule
Rule

Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995);
Ann. § 41-la-1314 (1998);
of Evidence 701;
of Evidence 704.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue:

Whether the theft conviction must be reversed where

the trial judge admitted lay opinion testimony that Appellant's
actions were deliberate?
Preservation.

This issue was preserved below.

R. 129:116,

13 0-31; see Addendum C containing portion of transcripts
preserving issue.

When the prosecutor asked the objectionable

question, defense counsel objected, stating that it called for
speculation.

R. 129:116.

Such an objection was sufficient to

alert the judge to the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 701 that lay
opinion must be (1) rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (2) helpful.

Since speculative testimony is not

rationally based on the perception of a witness and is not
helpful since it provides no further proof, defense counsel's
objection preserved this issue.
In addition, the record establishes that the trial judge was
actually alerted to the rule 701 requirement and based his ruling
on that rule of evidence.

He stated his reason for the ruling on

the record, pointing out that rule 701 requires that the witness'
opinion be "rationally based on the perception of the witness and
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or to
[de]termination of a fact [in] issue," and concluded that
Broadbent's testimony fit "squarely within that Rule 701."
R. 129:130.

Where the trial judge rules on a legal basis, the

rationale for waiver rules no longer exists.

See State v.

Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991)(recognizing that "one of the
primary reasons for imposing waiver rules like rule 103(a)(1) is
to assure that the trial court has the first opportunity to
address a claim that it erred.

If the trial court has already

had that opportunity, the justification for rigid waiver
requirements is weakened considerably.").

State v. Lucero, 866

P.2d 1, 5 fn 3 (Utah App. 1993) ("trial court's consideration and
ruling on the merits" preserved the issue).
Moreover, Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) requires "[i]n case the
ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to
2

strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of the
objection, if the specific around was not apparent from the
context... ."

The error was apparent from the context, as

evidenced by the trial judge's reference to Utah R. Evid. 701.
In this case, defense counsel stated the specific objection,
the trial judge actually ruled on the ground at issue in this
appeal, and the specific ground was apparent from the context.
Accordingly, the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) were met
and this issue was properly preserved.
Furthermore, even if the error was not properly preserved,
it was plain error for the judge to admit the testimony.

See

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) (to establish plain
error, appellant must show: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and the error is
harmful... . " ) .

The error was obvious since Utah R. Evid. 701

was in effect and requires that opinion evidence be rationally
based on a witness' perception and helpful to the jury.

Since

Broadbent's opinion was neither, Utah R. Evid. 701 precluded its
admission.

See discussion infra at 12-17.

The error was

prejudicial since intent was the only issue in this case, and
absent this evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood the jury
would have found that Kocher did not have an intent to
permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle.

See discussion

infra at 17-19.
Standard of Review.

Federal courts have applied an abuse of

discretion standard of review.

See e.q. United States v.
3

Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information dated November 5, 1997, the state charged
Defendant/Appellant John Richard Kocher ("Kocher," "Appellant" or
"Defendant") with Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404(1995), and Aggravated Assault, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp.
1998).

R. 1.

A jury trial was held on June 9 and 10, 1998.

R. 129.
The trial judge instructed the jury on theft, a second
degree felony, and the lesser included offense of theft of a
motor vehicle, a third degree felony, and aggravated assault and
the lesser included offense of reckless driving.
98.

R. 90, 92, 95,

The jury convicted Kocher on Count 1, theft, a second degree

felony, as charged in the Information and reckless driving, a
lesser included class B misdemeanor.

R. Ill, 112.

The trial

judge sentenced Kocher to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah
State Prison and to concurrently serve six months on the reckless
driving conviction.

R. 111-12.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On May 29, 1997, at about 6:00 p.m., John Kocher asked some
questions about a 1992 red Mitsubishi 3000GT sportscar at Brison
Imports, 4659 South State, then test drove the car.
113, 119, 121.

R. 129:112-

The salesman, Robert Broadbent, accompanied

Kocher on the test drive.

R. 129:112-13.

Broadbent takes all of his test drives on the same route.
4

R. 129:114-15.
Broadbent: Just real quickly our test drives are all
over the same route. We're on 46 [00] South State, we
go up to 4500 South State, make a right turn, go up 7th
East, make another right turn, go down to 480 0 South,
make another right turn and come back to State, that's
our standard procedure.
R. 129:114-15.
At 700 East, which is about the halfway point, Broadbent
asked Kocher to turn right.

R. 129:115.

Kocher stayed in the

center lane and continued without turning.

R. 12 9:115.

Broadbent said, "let's make a right turn at the next light."
R. 129:127.

Kocher acknowledged him, saying, "[o]kay, I must

have missed the light."

R. 129:127.

Broadbent became "a little bit agitated" and told Kocher he
"didn't have the time to drive all over and [he] needed to get
back and to make a right turn at [900 East]."

R. 129:115.

Kocher turned right as directed and stopped at the stop sign at
Vine Street.

R. 129:115.

Rather than turning right at Vine Street, which would have
headed back towards the car lot, Kocher "drove straight ahead and
stopped right in the middle of the road between both left and
right oncoming traffic."

R. 129:115.

cars coming from both directions.

They were almost hit by

R. 129:125.

Both Broadbent and Kocher were shaken up.

R. 129:125.

Broadbent asked Kocher to pull straight ahead, "get this thing
off the road, ... and then we can regroup."

R. 129:116.

Kocher

pulled onto a dead end street and got the car off the road.
R. 129:124.

Kocher was quiet and told Broadbent he was shaken up
5

and asked Broadbent to drive back.

R. 129:116, 124.

After Broadbent got out of the car, Kocher drove away.
R. 129:117.

Broadbent ran across the street to a residential

area and used the telephone.

About ten minutes later, while

standing outside using a phone, Broadbent saw Kocher drive by
again.

R. 129:118.

The next day, May 30, 1997, sometime between 11:00 a.m. and
2:00 p.m., two men in a red sportscar arrived at Beehive RV
Storage in Draper to rent a U-Haul.

R. 129:134, 140.

The

manager of the storage units left the two by the U-Haul, telling
them she had the wrong key, and went inside and called the police
because the pair made her uncomfortable.

R. 129:134, 140-41.

At least four police officers responded in three police
cars.

R. 129:135.

One of those officers was Deputy Cannon, who

stood outside his vehicle talking with the manager.
147.

R. 129:136,

The red car came back through the lot, around a corner.

R. 129:138.

The manager was standing fairly close to the police

car and the red car when she noticed the red car.
"he's coming."

R. 129:18.

She yelled,

Deputy Cannon tried to stop the car

by stepping around his vehicle and out in front of the red car,
standing in the middle of the road, and extending his arm.
R. 129:138-39, 148, 150.

The red car sped up and as it rounded

the corner, did not make any evasive movements to avoid the
deputy.

R. 129:138, 140, 149.

The officer moved, and the car

did not come closer than three feet to the officer.
149, 150.
6

R. 129:142,

Deputy Jones, who was also present, talked to the other
suspect at the storage unit.

R. 129:156.

Neff, lived at a nearby trailer park.

That person, Craig

R. 129:157.

The next day,

Deputy Jones went to Neff's trailer and arrested Kocher, who was
sleeping inside.

R. 129:158, 159.

When Jones arrested Kocher

and asked about the Mitsubishi, Kocher initially denied having
it.

R. 129:161.

While inside the trailer, Deputy Jones found

the key to the Mitsubishi.

R. 129:159.

Later, as Deputy Jones was driving Kocher to jail, Kocher
told him where the car was.

R. 129:159.

Kocher said the car was

parked in an apartment complex in West Valley City.

R. 129:159.

While he would not talk to Deputy Peterson about the location of
the car immediately after being arrested, Kocher told Deputy
Peterson the car's location shortly thereafter, indicating that
it was in an apartment complex parking lot on Redwood Road south
of Callister's.

R. 129:167.

Peterson went to the two or three

apartment complexes south of Callister's and recovered the car
shortly after Kocher was arrested on May 31, 1997.

R. 129:160.

The car was in a guest parking lot with a blue car cover
over it.

R. 12 9:168.

It did not appear to be damaged.

R. 129:168.
Barbara Kocher, Appellant's former wife, testified that
Kocher telephoned her in late May 1997 and asked to come get the
keys to a car he had test driven, then pick up the car and take
it back.
Draper.

R. 129:171.
R. 12 9:174.

Kocher was calling from a trailer house in
Kocher told her the car was in an apartment
7

complex next to Callister's.

R. 129:176.

There were only two

apartment complexes and she figured it was one of them and would
get more information when she picked up the keys.
77.

R. 12 9: 176-

Barbara's son was sick so she did not end up doing what

Kocher requested.

R. 129:171.

The day after Kocher phoned,

Barbara learned that he had been arrested.

R. 129:172.

When Kocher talked to Barbara about returning the car, he
also told her that when he was driving the car, he had seen a man
named Terry, and Kocher was afraid of Terry.

R. 12 9:172.

Kocher

was worried Terry would kill or hurt him or Kocher's girlfriend,
Stacey.

R. 129:175.

Barbara also testified that she had

suspicions that Kocher was using methamphetamine during May 1997
because he was acting differently, "was always on the go," and
did not have time for his child.

R. 129:173.

Stacey Belgard, Kocher's fiancee testified that Kocher had
told her he took off in the car because he had seen Terry and was
frightened.

R. 129:179-180.

Terry had beaten up Stacey, held

her for hours, raped her, and done other frightening things.
R. 129:179, 182.
Kocher had been awake for days, and using methamphetamine.
R. 129:179.

Methamphetamine made him think everyone was after

him and he became incoherent.

R. 12:179.

Kocher telephoned Stacey and told her "that he was just
freaking out and he was in a car and he'd just left the guy
because Terry was coming after, he had a gun... ."
Kocher wanted her to go to the trailer.
8

R. 129:180.

When she got there,

Kocher told her that while he was test driving a car, he had
pulled over and had seen Terry and got scared and drove away.
R. 129:181.

They also talked about getting the car back to the

dealership.

Kocher told Stacey that he had talked to Barbara and

that Barbara was on the way to get the keys to take the car back.
R. 129:181.

Kocher was arrested the next morning.

R. 129:181.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah R. Evid. 701 has two requirements, both of which must
be met in order to admit opinion testimony of a lay witness.

The

testimony must be (1) "rationally based on the perceptions of the
witness" and (2) "helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or a determination of a fact in issue."

The

salesman's opinion that Appellant acted deliberately fit neither
of these requirements and therefore was inadmissible under the
rule.

Because the error was harmful, a new trial is required.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE THEFT COUNT REQUIRES REVERSAL WHERE THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE SALESMAN TO TESTIFY
AS TO HIS OPINION REGARDING APPELLANT'S MENTAL STATE.
Robert Broadbent, the primary witness on the theft charge,

testified that during the test drive, Kocher pulled into oncoming
traffic and shortly thereafter, pulled over and asked Broadbent
to drive.

R. 12 9:115-16.

After asking Broadbent whether Kocher

appeared to be shaken up by pulling into traffic, the prosecutor
asked, "[n]ow, you were with him, do you feel his actions were
deliberate or accidental?"

R. 129:116.

Defense counsel

objected, saying that the question called for speculation.
9

R. 129:116.

The trial judge overruled the objection.

R. 12 9:116.

Broadbent responded that Kocher's actions were

"deliberate because the observed driving before and after was
what would be called acceptable."

R. 129:116.

Near the conclusion of Broadbent's testimony, the trial
judge made a record of the basis for his ruling.

R. 129:130.

He

stated:
... let me just indicate that I didn't cite the rule
that I intended to with respect to Ms. Stam's
objection, the opinion testimony of a witness. Rule
701 specifically allows a witness to testify in
situations that the opinion is rationally based on the
perception of the witness and helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness testimony or to
[de]termination of fact [in] issue. And it seems to me
that his opinion as to accidental or determined is
squarely within rule 701. I just wanted to state the
reason for the ruling.
R. 129:130.
The next witness, the manager of the storage unit, testified
regarding Count II, the charge of aggravated assault.

After the

manager testified regarding Kocher's actions in driving out of
the storage unit parking lot, the prosecutor asked, "... do you
have an opinion as to whether or not he deliberately aimed at the
officer or whether it was accidental?"

R. 129:140.

Defense

counsel objected that this presented a question for the jury.
R. 129:140.

Although this question was essentially identical to

the one Broadbent was allowed to answer, the trial judge
sustained this second objection, stating, "I'll sustain that
objection.
R. 129:140.

That is the ultimate fact for the jury to determine."
The jury concluded that Kocher's actions regarding
10

the incident charged in Count II did not amount to an intentional
aggravated assault, and instead convicted him of the lesser
reckless driving.
In allowing Broadbent to testify that Kocher's actions were
deliberate, the trial judge committed reversible error.

Utah R.

Evid. 701 states:
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the
witness' testimony in the form of opinions or
inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or a determination of a fact in
issue.
Very few Utah cases have applied this rule or its
predecessor.

In Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982), the

Court held that testimony of a mother as to gestation was
admissible under former rule 56, Utah Rules of Evidence.1

The

Court concluded in Roods that the mother's lay opinion was
rationally based on her perception and

MX

helpful to a clear

understanding of (the) testimony or to the determination of the
fact in issue.'"

Roods, 645 P.2d at 642.

It stated:

With the noticeable physical discomfort and body
changes attendant to pregnancy, the mother is in a
position to observe the approximate length of her
1

Former Utah R. Evid. 56 was substantially similar to the
current Utah R. Evid. 701. Rule 56 stated in pertinent part:
TESTIMONY IN THE FORM OF OPINION.
(1) If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his
testimony in the form of opinions or inference is limited
to such opinions or inferences as the judge finds (a) may
be rationally based on the perception of the witness, and
(b) are helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony
or to the determination of the fact in issue... .
11

pregnancy first hand. Certainly her estimation as to
the period of gestation is both rationally based upon
her perception and helpful to a clear understanding of
the length of term of her child. Therefore, the trial
court's admission of the mother's testimony on the
subject of gestation was not error.
Id.
In State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987), the Court held
that the testimony of a lay witness that footprints outside and
inside a house appeared to be the same was admissible under Utah
R. Evid. 701.

The Court reasoned that the testimony of the

witness, a security guard, was based on his perception since he
examined the footprints at the scene and later viewed photographs
of them, and the testimony was helpful.

Although the security

guard's testimony was also "capable of scientific determination,"
"that does not mean that lay opinion testimony is prohibited if
the provisions of the evidentiary rule are met."

Id. at 191.

In the present case, neither requirement of rule 701 was met
and the testimony was therefore inadmissible.

First, Broadbent's

testimony was not "rationally based on the perception of the
witness."

While a witness is able to describe actions, gestures,

facial expressions, and other observations, a witness cannot
rationally ascertain the mental state of another.

This notion

that a witness can describe what he observed but cannot testify
as to "what another person meant, or as to his intentions" is
firmly rooted and was recognized in case law over a hundred years
ago.

See State v. Kilburn, 52 P. 277 (Utah 1898) .
While an individual should know what his intentions
were at any given time, and when competent, relevant,
and material as evidence he may swear to them, other
12

persons can only know them from his outward
expressions. The jury might infer what the defendant
meant, or what his intentions were, from what he said
or did or failed to do, but the witnesses could not
give their inferences from them to the jury.
Id. at 277; accord Johnson v. State, 584 N.E.2d 1092, 1104 (Ind.
1992) .
In contrast to Ellis, where the witness examined footprints
then described them, and Roods, where the witness experienced the
gestation period then described it, the witness in this case did
not observe "deliberateness."

Instead, Broadbent drew a

conclusion from his observations and was allowed to tell the jury
that conclusion.

Additionally, nothing in the evidence suggested

that Broadbent had any specialized knowledge or experience which
would aid him in making this determination.
Moreover, Broadbent was in the car with Kocher for only a
short time.

The beginning portion involved routine driving

covering less than a mile.

R. 129:115.

After Kocher missed the

turn on 7th East, Broadbent became upset and agitated and told
Kocher that he "didn't have the time to drive all over and [he]
needed to get back and to make a right turn at which he did, and
stopped at a stop sign at Vine Street."

R. 129:115.

Immediately

thereafter, Kocher committed the driving error which landed the
car in the midst of oncoming traffic from two directions by
pulling forward at Vine Street rather than turning.

R. 12 9:115.

Broadbent testified that, in his opinion, Kocher's driving up to
the stop sign at Vine Street was acceptable.

R. 129:115.

Broadbent also testified that he was shaken up after the incident
13

and that he felt like Kocher probably was, too.
Prosecutor:

R. 129:116.

Did he appear shook up?

Broadbent: Well, his actions indicated that he
probably should have been after pulling out in front of
all the traffic so I accepted that as yes I was upset
so I felt like probably he was so I was going to get
out and drive.
R. 129:116.
Immediately after this passage indicating that Kocher was
shaken up and "his actions indicated that he probably should have
been," Broadbent speculated that Kocher's actions were deliberate
because his driving was acceptable both before and after the
incident.

The testimony that the driving was acceptable after

the incident conflicts with the above testimony.

Moreover,

Broadbent's opinion that the driving was "acceptable" was not
itself an observation; indeed, Broadbent's testimony that Kocher
did not turn at 7th East would suggest that the driving prior to
the Vine Street incident was not acceptable.
Under such circumstances, Broadbent was not in a position to
testify as to Kocher's mental state, and his testimony that
Kocher's actions were deliberate was not rationally based on his
perceptions.

Additionally, Broadbent's obvious irritation, fear

and agitation interfered with his ability to assess whether
Kocher's actions were deliberate.

This failure to meet the

requirement of subsection (a) that the testimony be rationally
based on the witness' perceptions, standing alone precluded
admission of Broadbent's testimony.
The requirement of subsection (b) also was not met since the
14

testimony was not "helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness' testimony or a determination of a fact in issue."
Broadbent had already testified regarding Kocher's driving and
Broadbent's belief that Kocher's driving appeared okay before the
oncoming traffic incident.

R. 129:116.

The jury therefore had

before it the information upon which Broadbent based his
conclusion that Kocher acted deliberately.

The jury, not

Broadbent, should have made any appropriate findings.

See

Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245 at 250.
In Anderskow, the Third Circuit concluded that a witness'
subjective belief that the defendants "must have known" did not
meet the "'helpfulness'" requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence
701(b) .

Id. at 250.2

The Court pointed out that "where the

jury has before it the same circumstantial evidence of a
defendant's criminal knowledge on which a witness bases an
opinion concerning a defendant's knowledge, testimony from a
witness concluding that the defendant

x

had to know' usually will

not meet Rule 701 (b)'s helpfulness requirement... ."

Id.

(citing United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992)).
[W]hen a witness has fully described what a defendant
was in a position to observe, what the defendant was
told, and what the defendant said or did, the witness'
opinion as to the defendant's knowledge will often not
be "helpful" within the meaning of Rule 701 because the
jury will be in as good a position as the witness to
draw the inference as to whether or not the defendant knew.
2

Utah R. Evid. 701 and 704 were adopted verbatim from the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
Federal interpretations provide
guidance in analyzing these rules. See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d
1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986); State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah
App. 1991).
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Anderskow, 88 F.3d at 250 (quoting Rea, 958 P.2d at 1216); see
crenerallv United States v. Greene, 116 F.3d 1481 (6th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing that "Rules 701 and 702 require that opinions be
helpful to the jury to ensure that opinions that merely tell a
jury what result to reach are not admitted").
The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 704
further clarifies that lay opinion testimony which goes to the
ultimate issue in that it merely tells the jury what result to
reach is not "helpful" to the jury and therefore is not
admissible under rule 701.

The Advisory Committee Note states:

The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower
the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701
and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact,
and Rule 4 03 provides for exclusion of evidence which
wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances
against the admission of opinions which would merely
tell the jury what result to reach... .
Fed. R. Evid. 704 Advisory Committee Note.
This Court took a similar view in a footnote in Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1232 fn 7 (Utah App. 1991).

This Court

stated:
Furthermore, Rule 704 must be read in conjunction with
the other rules of evidence. Thus, while [Rule 704]
permits expert opinion testimony on an ultimate issue,
Rule 704 does not mean that all opinions are admissible
into evidence. Rules 701 and 702 require,
respectively, that the opinions of lay and expert
witnesses assist the trier of fact. And Rule 4 03
provides for the exclusion of evidence which wastes
time. Thus, if a witness's opinion will do little more
than tell the jury what result to reach, it will be
inadmissible.
Id. (citing 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice
§ 704.02, at Vll-63 (1989)) (emphasis added); see also State v.
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Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 547 (Utah App. 1998)(reiterating that
"questions which would merely allow the witness to tell the jury
what result to reach are not permitted").
Moreover, the plain language of rule 704 appears to bar lay
witnesses from testifying as to the state of mind of the
defendant.

Rule 704 states:

Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b),
testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to
the mental state or condition of a defendant in a
criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
state or condition constituting an element of the crime
charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues
are matters for the trier of fact alone.
This rule, particularly the last sentence, appears to
preclude any witness, whether lay or expert from testifying as to
the defendant's mental state since "[s]uch ultimate issues are
matters for the trier of fact alone."
Opinion testimony must meet both requirements of rule 701 in
order to be admissible.

In this case, where the opinion

testimony met neither requirement because it was not rationally
based on the perception of the witness and was not helpful to the
jury, the trial court erred in admitting the testimony.
The error in admitting Broadbent's testimony was harmful.
Broadbent was the principal witness regarding the theft charge.
The issue for the jury to decide on that charge was whether
Kocher intended to permanently deprive the owner, intended to
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temporarily deprive the owner, or had no intent to deprive.
Broadbent's testimony went to the heart of this issue and
essentially allowed him to act as additional juror, with the
added weight that his determination was under oath and admitted
as evidence.
The evidence in this case showed that Kocher took the car
while test driving it.

In Broadbent's opinion, Kocher's driving

was acceptable both before and after the oncoming traffic
incident.

The driving after the incident was very brief since

Kocher was merely looking for a place to pull over to change
drivers.

R. 129:116, 124, 125.

Additionally, Broadbent was

upset and less likely to fully observe driving errors.
R. 129:125.
routine.

The driving prior to the incident was somewhat

R. 129:114-15.

Moreover, Kocher made driving errors in

failing to turn at 7th East and the stop sign.

R. 129:115, 127.

The jury may well have weighed the testimony regarding Kocher's
driving and other actions differently than Broadbent and
determined that it did not demonstrate deliberate actions or
intent to permanently deprive.
Indeed, Broadbent's testimony regarding his observations of
Kocher's driving was susceptible to a determination that Kocher
drove into oncoming traffic due to methamphetamine ingestion
rather than deliberate conduct.

The jury could have found that

Kocher's failure to turn at 7th East and his significant driving
error in pulling into traffic supported his defense that he was
affected by methamphetamine and that when he later saw Terry
18

Lewis while pulled over to change drivers, Kocher became
extremely frightened and drove off.

Such a finding coupled with

the evidence that Kocher attempted to make arrangements to return
the car before he was arrested, would have supported a verdict of
not guilty because Kocher did not have the intent to permanently
deprive, or a verdict of guilty on the lesser charge because even
if Kocher had the intent to deprive, such intent was only for
temporary deprivation.
Although the trial judge allowed Broadbent to testify that
Kocher's actions were deliberate, he later refused to allow the
manager of the storage units to answer a similar question as to
whether Kocher7s actions in driving toward the officer were
deliberate.

R. 12 9:140.

On that count, the jury convicted

Kocher of reckless driving rather than intentional aggravated
assault.

This underscores the importance of Broadbent's

testimony that Kocher's actions were deliberate.

In this case

where plausible evidence existed which supported acquittal or
conviction on a lesser included offense, there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result had the trial judge not
erred in admitting the testimony.

See generally State v.

Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 194 (Utah App. 1988) (an error is harmful
requiring reversal if there is a reasonable likelihood it
affected the outcome).
Because rule 701 precluded admission of Broadbent's opinion
testimony, the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing
Broadbent to state his opinion.

The prejudicial nature of that
19

error requires reversal of Kocher's conviction for theft.
CONCLUSION
Appellant John Richard Kocher respectfully requests that
this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new
trial.
SUBMITTED this 33AJL day of June, 1999.

C&*^- ufcw
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

KAREN STAM
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 971000782 FS

JOHN RICHARD KOCHER,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
July 23, 1998

PRESENT
Clerk:
christeh
Prosecutor: STEVE MERCER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAREN STAM
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 28, 1969
Audio
Tape Number:
98170
Tape Count: 5430
CHARGES
1. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 06/10/1998 {Guilty - Jury}

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1

Case No: 971000782
Date:
Jul 23, 1998

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SENTENCED WITHOUT A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT.
II TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH COUNT I.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE

COUNT

THE COURT RECOMMENDS THEAT DEFENDANT BE ALLOWED TO ENTER INTO
MENTAL HEALTH AND DRUG COUNSELING. THE COURT RECOMMENDS CREDIT FOR
TIME SERVED FOR JAIL TIME SERVED (218 DAYS). DEFENDANT WAS
SENTENCED WITHOUT A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT.

Based on the defendant's conviction of RECKLESS DRIVING a Class A
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)

Dated this
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day of

Page 2 (last)

ADDENDUM B

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

41-la-1314. Unauthorized control for extended time.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), it is a class A misdemeanor for a
person to exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer, not his own, without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian,
and with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of
possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer.
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the
control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different
person.
(3) Violation of this section is a third degree felony if:
(a) the person does not return the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer
to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of
unlawful control; or
(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct of the person committing
the offense:
(i) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in an
amount of $500 or more;
(ii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is used to commit a
felony; or
(iii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in any
amount to facilitate entry into it or its operation.
(4) It is not a defense to Subsection (3)(a) that someone other than the
person, or an agent of the person, returned the motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer within 24 hours.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

ADDENDUM C
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1 car.
2

Did he eventually move the car?
A

He did pull straight ahead into a residential

3 area, I think the sign says Dead End, but it went for about
4

a block, turned right at a stop sign, and that's where he

5 said he was too shook up, needed me to drive back to which I
6 was more than happy to do.
7

Q

Okay, so he at that time asked you if you would

8 drive back?
9

A

He did.

10

Q

Did he appear to be shook up?

11

A

Well, his actions indicated that he probably

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

should have been after pulling out in front of all the
traffic so I accepted that as yes I was upset so I felt like
he probably would be and he was so I was going to get out
and drive.
Q

Okay.

Now you were with him, did you feel that

his actions were deliberate or accidental?
MS. STAM:
for a speculation.
THE COURT:

Well, Your Honor, that kind of calls
I'm going to object to that.
I'll overrule the objection and let

the witness answer.
21
THE WITNESS: Well, as I looked back upon it I
22
would say it was deliberate because the observed driving
23
before and after was what would be called acceptable.
24
MS. MANN:
25

Okay.
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1

Q

BY MR. MACK:

Do you remember before the test

2 drive, I guess as part of the 10 minute conversation,
3

something to the effect of there having been an engine

4

replaced in the car or some necessity to jump start that car

5 before you could test drive it?
6

A

If I recall the battery was low.

We did jump it

7 to start it, jumped the battery, uh-huh.
8

Q

All right.

So that would have been, that could

9 have been some of the other conversation that filled the 10
10 minutes?
11

A

Perhaps.

12

MR. MACK:

13

THE COURT:

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Thank you.
Do you have other questions for this

witness, Ms. Mann?
MS. MANN:

Just a couple, Your Honor.

THE COURT: While you're walking up let me just
indicate that I didn't cite the rule that I intended to with
respect to Ms. Stam's objection, the opinion testimony of
the witness.

Rule 701 specifically allows a witness to

testify in situations that the opinion is rationally based
on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness testimony or to termination of

22
fact an issue.

And it seems to me that his opinion as to

23
accidental or determined is squarely within that Rule 701.
24
I just wanted to state that reason for the ruling.
25

Go ahead

131
1 II with your question then.
28

MS. MANN:

Thank you, Judge.

3
4
5

|

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

[ BY US, MANN;

6

Q

Now, you stated this car can accelerate fast, it

7 will accelerate fast.
8

A

Yes, ma'am.

9

Q

When the defendant drove away from you and when

10 you saw him driving back past you, did you hear the tires
11

squeal?

12

A

I don't recall, no.

13

Q

Did it appear that he was accelerating at an

14

excessive speed?

-^
16

A

The first time when he departed he departed

I promptly, promptly is all I'm going to say.

17

Q

Okay.

18 ||

A

Did not appear to be calling attention to

19

squealing tires or anything.

He just departed promptly,

20 went up to Vine Street and made a left turn and disappeared.
21

The next time that he came around when I was on the

22

telephone it was just driving up the street in what appeared

23

to be a very normal fashion like maybe 30 miles an hour, not

24

even going anywhere in a hurry.

25

Q

So he just normally drove right back past the same

